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Abstract 
This article examines the impact of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) on the development of the 
principles of theft. The Roman and South African law of theft 
forms the basis of such a study. This investigation is made 
against the background principle that the law of theft has to do 
with the traditional forms of property, for example corporeals 
and incorporeals. Therefore, it is enquired whether the non-
traditional forms of property, for example information or data is 
or can be regarded as property that is capable of being stolen 
for legal purposes or not.  
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1 Introduction 
In recent times, society has witnessed the rapid development of 
information and communication technologies.1 Generally, the term 
"technology" is used with reference to how the hardware of a system, 
machine or mechanism functions,2 or with regard to other aspects of 
operations which do not involve human agency, such as software.3 
Examples of such information technology (ICT) are the Internet4 and the 
World Wide Web.5 ICTs are a conglomeration of different infrastructures. 
These are codes, architectures, hardware or software. They facilitate 
communication by or between users.6 They also enable computers to 
locate other computers, to communicate with one another and to transmit 
and receive data. The word "data" refers to the electronic representation of 
information7 in any form,8 which means that it can be represented 
manually or automatically.  
ICTs influence the behaviour of people and consequently that of society.9 
Governments, private institutions, businesses and computer users rely on 
these ICTs to interact with one another and sometimes to do business 
online. Sometimes this influence is so unreal that its effects were in the 
past only imagined in science fiction. This is the case because the 
activities that are carried out by means of these technologies are not 
particularly comparable to those that are known to an offline society. 
Consequently, ICTs facilitate the creation of a new society. In 
                                            
* This contribution was based on a research done for the author's LLD thesis, entitled 
"E-crimes and E-Authentication – A Legal Perspective" for which the author was 
registered for at the University of South Africa (UNISA). 
** Mzukisi Niven Njotini. LLB (Vista University), LLM cum laude (UNISA), LLD (UNISA). 
Senior Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence, College of Law, UNISA. Email: 
njotim@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Hereinafter referred to as ICTs. 
2  Grübler Technology 20. 
3  Restivo Science, Technology and Society XIX. 
4  In terms of s 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
(hereinafter referred to as the ECT Act) the Internet is "the interconnected system of 
networks that connects computers around the world using the TCP/IP and includes 
future versions thereof". 
5  Hereinafter referred to as the Web or WWW. The Web is an "information browsing 
framework that allows a user to locate and access information stored on a remote 
computer and to follow references from one computer to related information on 
another computer". S 1 of the ECT Act. 
6  Lee and Lee "Mobile Commerce and National IT Infrastructure" 352. 
7  The term "information" denotes any "piece of news with a meaning for the recipient; 
its assimilation usually causes a change within the recipient". See Sieber 
"Emergence of Information Law" 10-11. 
8  Section 1 of the ECT Act. 
9  See Erlank Property in Virtual Worlds; Jankowich 2005 BUJSTL. 
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technological terms, this society is referred to as the information society. 
An information society is a kind of online society where "low-cost 
information and data storage and transmission technologies are in general 
use".10 It is characterised by a "high level of information intensity in the 
everyday lives of most citizens, in most organisations and workplaces, by 
the use of common or compatible technology for a wide range of personal, 
social, educational or business activities".11  
In this paper the impact that ICTs have on the principles of theft is 
examined. This discussion is undertaken having in mind the fact that the 
law of theft protects property and has previously been entirely concerned 
with traditional forms of property. This notion of property relates to that in 
relation to which a physical contrectatio is possible. In this respect it is 
argued that for theft to exist a surreptitious carrying away or auferre of a 
thing with fraudulent intention should exist.12 Having regard to the 
aforesaid, it is argued that the question regarding whether or not certain 
incorporeals, for example data, could be stolen is not answered. More 
specifically, is data property that is capable of being stolen for legal 
purposes? With a view to investigating this question, a distinction is made 
between corporeal and incorporeal property. This difference assists in 
determining whether or not data is property. If it is found that data is not 
property within the context of the law of theft, an enquiry is then made on 
whether or not the principles of the law of theft can be adapted in order to 
accommodate the importance of data to an information society. The 
Roman and South African law approaches to theft are examined for this 
purpose. The basis for this scrutiny is to trace the developments of the law 
relating to theft and to establish if this body of law is capable of being 
expanded in order to respond to prevailing societal needs. Thereafter, a 
summary of the facts and the way forward in relation to the position of data 
in the law of theft is provided. 
2 Corporeal and incorporeal property 
2.1 Corporeal property 
Corporeal property is the original category of things that were recognised 
as property in early Rome.13 It includes all the tangible things that can by 
                                            
10  Soete Building the European Information Society 11. 
11  Durrani Information and Liberation 256. 
12  Du Plessis Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law 338. 
13  Thomas Institutes of Justinian 73. 
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nature be touched.14 Moreover, it encompasses property which is 
perceptible through the senses.15 In classical Roman law, the examples of 
res corporales included things such as land, a slave, a garment, gold or 
silver.16  
The question regarding the corporeal nature of a thing depends on its 
being capable of conveyance.17 It is inquired whether or not the thing is a 
res in commercio.18 Conveyance should be understood according to what 
the notion meant to a Roman lawyer. In Roman law, conveyance 
depended on whether the property was res mancipi – that is, property in 
terms of which the Roman paterfamilias had control and management on 
behalf of the household − or res nec mancipi – examples are: stipendiary 
and tributary land and wild beasts.19 In the case of res mancipi the 
conveyance of ownership in property was a process and not an incident. It 
was carried out by means of a solemn act and this act was known as 
mancipatio (and later on as in jure cessio).20 Mancipatio was a sort of 
emblematical sale or imaginaria venditio.21 In the case of res nec mancipi, 
a conveyance of ownership in property was, if these things were res 
corporales, effected by traditio − that is delivery.22 
Ownership or dominium is an essential concept in the study of the Roman 
law of property. It is distinguished from the notion of possession, being the 
physical control of property (corpus), with the intention (animus) of 
excluding all others in society.23 It denotes "absolute lordship over a 
thing".24 The term "absolute" can be interpreted to mean two different 
things. Firstly, it could mean that an owner is allowed, subject to negligible 
limitations in terms of the law, to do with his or her property as he or she 
                                            
14  Sandars Institutes of Justinian 194-195. 
15  Moussourakis Fundamentals of Roman Private Law 121. 
16  Moussourakis Fundamentals of Roman Private Law 121. 
17  Kaser Roman Private Law 80. 
18  Kaser Roman Private Law 80. 
19  Diósdi Ownership 20. 
20  Sohm Institutes 305-306. The period in which mancipatio was adapted to mean a 
conveyance of ownership of property in jure cessio is not known by Roman law 
jurists. However, it is acknowledged that the adaptation indeed took place sometime 
in the history of Roman law. See De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius 57. 
21  Gai.I.119. 
22  Gai.II.19. 
23  Keenan English Law 211. 
24  Declareuil Rome 158. 
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pleases.25 Secondly, it could suggest that "apart from the owner … nobody 
else can be the owner".26 
The recognition of property as corporeal also appears in South Africa, 
where corporeal property again refers to physical objects.27 These are 
objects that are part of a tangible reality.28 A tangible reality can be 
interpreted to mean an object which is "perceptible through sight and 
touch".29 The object must occupy some space. It must also be capable of 
being sensed by means of any of the five traditional senses.30 These 
objects may be movables such as a horse, furniture, a motorbike, an 
oxygen cylinder or a ship, or immovables such as landed property or fruit 
that is still hanging on a tree.31  
It is important to note that the current description of corporeal property has 
been severely attacked in the recent past.32 The argument is that a 
reliance on the tangibility of an object as one of the criteria for determining 
its corporeality is problematic.33 It particularly leads or could lead to 
objects, for example, various gases, that naturally are excluded in the 
description of corporeal property being regarded as res corporales.34 With 
reference to gases, it is submitted that although they cannot be touched, 
they can be "perceived by some of the external factors".35 Furthermore, 
there are others who state that the exclusion of natural forces and/or 
energies, for example gravity, heat, sound and electricity from the 
description of corporeal property is an ancient formulation of the concept 
of property.36 It fails to respond to modern developments. Furthermore, it 
disregards the fact that some of these objects are so analogous to 
                                            
25  Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex Dominium" 213. 
26  Van der Walt and Kleyn "Duplex Dominium" 213. 
27  It is argued that a distinction has to be made between objects in the conventional 
sense and objects in a legal sense. Conventionally, all objects are property. 
However, objects for juridical purposes must establish a legal relationship before 
they can be said to be property. See Oosthuizen Law of Property 3. In other words, 
they must be such that a person will be able to "acquire and hold a right". See Van 
der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 2nd ed 11. 
28  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 3rd ed 14. 
29  Maasdorp Institutes of South Africa 1. 
30  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 3rd ed 14. 
31  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 3rd ed 14. 
32  See in general Kleyn, Boraine and Du Plessis Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law 
of Property. 
33  Kleyn, Boraine and Du Plessis Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 30. 
34  Kleyn, Boraine and Du Plessis Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 30. 
35  Kleyn, Boraine and Du Plessis Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 30. 
36  Van der Merwe Law of Things 13. 
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traditional corporeal property that they should be regarded as having 
corporeal existence.37  
2.2 Incorporeal property 
Traditionally, uncertainty existed regarding whether or not property rights 
exist or should exist in respect of incorporeal things.38 This was the case 
because it was deemed to be legally illogical to define property as an 
object of a right and then submit that a right is also the object of a right.39 
Despite this uncertainty, it was soon realised that property rights should 
generally not be limited to tangible and physical objects only. The cases of 
S v Kotze40 and Cooper v Boyes41 can be mentioned as examples. These 
cases evidence a move towards recognising the existence of property 
rights to incorporeal objects. By so doing, they re-affirm the idea that 
property rights are or should not be limited to tangible things. 
S v Kotze dealt with money which is held or kept by a bank on behalf of 
person (an account holder) in a bank account. The court conceded to the 
fact that an account holder does not necessarily own such money. 
However, this does not mean that he or she is not a person with a special 
property or interest in it. Consequently, this interest, the court stated, is 
relevant and sufficient to an inquiry regarding whether or not property 
rights to the money is possible. In Cooper v Boyes the facts were briefly 
that a testator (Jack Marshall Cooper) executed a will in terms of which he 
bequeathed one half of the residue of his estate to his son (Cooper). The 
residue comprised of particular shares and cash assets amounting to 
R357 034.13. The court had to decide, amongst other things, whether or 
not the shares could, given the fact that they generate an interest to a 
shareholder (in this case, Cooper),42 be regarded as property.43 The court 
concluded that shares are incorporeal movable property and cannot be 
compared to corporeal property such as cash money.44 However, they 
sometimes generate interest or value to an owner or shareholder.45 
                                            
37  See in general Froman v Herbmore Timber and Hardware (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 609 
(W). 
38  Ex Parte Eloff 1953 1 SA 617 (T) 617. 
39  Ex Parte Eloff 1953 1 SA 617 (T) 617. 
40  S v Kotze 1961 1 SA 118 (SCA). 
41  Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (CPD). 
42  Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 
288H; Borland's Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd 1901 1 Ch 279 288. 
43  Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (CPD) 523D. 
44  Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (CPD) 535B-C. 
45  Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (CPD) 535B-C. 
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Accordingly, this interest gives an owner a reasonable expectation that it 
will be recognised as property in terms of the law of property.46  
The cases mentioned above demonstrate a departure from the 
established principle that property rights exist only in relation to corporeal 
property. More specifically, it is shown that property rights to certain 
incorporeals are also possible. Incorporeal property is an "artificial or 
fictitious" object.47 Such objects are neither visible nor tangible.48 They are 
incapable of physical possession.49 These include objects where there is 
neither factual control nor corpus nor an intention to possess or animus 
possidendi.50 The most obvious examples of incorporeal property are a 
right and duty.51 However, incorporeal property in the form of rights and 
duties operates as objects of limited real rights.52  
Despite the discussion of corporeals and incorporeals above it is 
submitted that a problem arises in cases where data is appropriated 
without lawful consent. Consequently, it is necessary to ask whether or not 
it is legally possible to appropriate data. If the answer is in the negative, is 
it then possible to develop the principles of theft in such a manner that 
data can be recognised as being capable of being stolen? In order to 
respond to these questions, the Roman, English and South African law of 
theft are investigated. This selection is important to this paper. More 
specifically, it signifies the influence that the Roman law principle of 
contrectatio and the English law principle of "appropriation" have had on 
the South African law of theft.  
3 Roman law 
3.1 Background 
In Roman law the term furtum is used as the equivalent of the word "theft". 
The word furtum originated in the Latin expression furvus.53 In English the 
phrase furvus denotes dusky, swarthy, dark or darkness.54 From this it is 
said that furtum is associated with the method or methods that are used to 
                                            
46  Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (CPD) 535F. 
47  Maasdorp Institutes of South Africa 1. 
48  Maasdorp Institutes of South Africa 1. 
49  Nathan Common Law of South Africa 310-311. 
50  Van der Merwe "Law of Property" 203-204. 
51  Oosthuizen Law of Property 9. 
52  See the criticism regarding the corporeality of such things in Oosthuizen Law of 
Property 4. 
53  Colquhoun Roman Civil Law 206. 
54  Valpy Etymological Dictionary 169. 
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perpetrate theft. In particular, Labeo argues that furtum is committed quod 
clam et obscuro fiat et plerumque nocte, that is, it is committed 
surreptitiously, in the dark or at night.55  
In Classical Rome furtum was regarded as a private wrong or delict. 
Accordingly, it was a fraction of the four (4) pillars of delicts that formed 
the basis of the Roman law of obligations.56 The others were iniuria (for 
example, convicium, adtemptata puditia and ne quid infamandi causa fiat); 
damage to property (excluding violence), and rapina or violent damage to 
property.57 Collectively, the delicts were referred to as the crimen.58 The 
Roman law of furtum is influenced by two (2) contrasting periods. These 
ages are termed the classical and the post-classical periods. An 
examination of furtum in the classical period is symbolised by the concept 
inter alia of the Law of the Twelve Tables and the Digest. However, a post-
classical revision of the concept of furtum is characterised by the 
acceptance of the Institutes of Justinian. 
3.2 Classical 
In classical Roman law, furtum was described as the contrectatio rei 
fraudulosa lucri faciendi gratia vel ipsius rei vel usus eius possessionisve 
quod lege naturali prohibitum est admittere.59 In English this means the 
"dishonest handling of a thing (or property) in order to make gain either out 
of the thing (or property) itself or else out of the use or possession thereof. 
From such conduct natural law commands us to abstain".60 This 
description represents the original description of furtum known to classical 
Romans.61 It also represents one of the "finer definition(s)" of furtum 
recognised in classical Roman times.62  
Furtum has at least four (4) constituent parts or elements. The 
components are touching or handling (contrectatio); fraud (rei fraudulosa); 
the making of gain (lucri faciendi gratia); and the use or possession (ipsius 
rei vel usus eius possessionisve) of property.  
3.2.1 Contrectatio 
                                            
55  Digest XLVII.2. 
56  Watson Western Private Law 124. 
57  Robinson 1998 J Leg Hist 246-249. 
58  Smith and Anthon Greek and Roman Antiquities 463. 
59  Digest XLVII.2.3. 
60  Jolowicz Digest XLVII.2 De Furtis 1-2. 
61  Watson Roman Private Law. 
62  Watson Roman Private Law 269. 
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Contrectatio is sometimes referred to as adtrectatio.63 Zimmerman states 
that contrectatio means a "touching, handling, fondling, pawing or 
interfering with" property.64 However, this view is challenged by some 
academics.65 Consequently, it is argued that contrectatio encompasses a 
meddling with the property. Meddling is any dishonest taking and carrying 
away of property.66 Again, the association of contrectatio with meddling is 
questioned. More specifically, it is submitted that the view regarding the 
meddling with the property is not founded on and does not represent the 
traditional Roman law description of furtum. The incidence of "meddling" 
as opposed to "touching" and "handling" is the result of the influence of the 
English common-law approach to theft. 
Despite these contending views, it is agreed that contrectatio denotes a 
"handling or touching" of property. However, it is not clear whether a 
handling or touching of the whole or part of the property is sufficient or not. 
Paulus argues that liability should result as if the contrectatio was in 
respect of the whole property.67 In this instance, a touching or handling of 
a part or portion of property can be equated to the touching or handling of 
the entire property. However, Ulpian submits that contrectatio should be 
limited to only the part of the property which is or was touched and/or 
handled.68  
3.2.2 Rei fraudulosa 
Scott provides meaning to the classical Roman law perspective of the 
notion of "fraud" by referring to Paulus' Book I.VIII.I. According to Scott, 
fraud takes place "when one (thing) is done, and another (thing) is 
presented".69 Therefore, there should be an unacceptable or dishonest 
conduct which accompanies the contrectatio. This should amount to an 
"unlawful or fraudulent" touching or handling of the property.70 The 
contrectatio must be invito domino. Wicked intention or dolus malus must 
be present. This dolus malus relates to an intention to commit furtum. In 
other words, contrectatio must be committed with the necessary fraudulent 
intention.71 Consent to the touching or handling of the property excludes 
                                            
63  Gellius Noctes 11.18.20.22.23. 
64  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 924-925. 
65  Buckland Text-Book of Roman Law 557. 
66  Buckland Text-Book of Roman Law 557. 
67  Digest 47.2.21. 
68  Honoré Justinian's Digest 138; Duff 1954 CLJ 87. 
69  Scott Civil Law 262. 
70  Burdick Principles of Roman Law 487. 
71  Gaius III.197. 
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the fraudulent intention.72 Furthermore, furtum does not arise in cases 
where a person breaks into a house with the intention of injuring the owner 
of a house, and thereafter another person enters the house, which is still 
broken into, with the intention of touching or handling property belonging 
to the owner.73 However, furtum arises if a person recognises that what he 
or she commits is theft.74 Thus, "some object on which the guilty mind can 
operate" must be or have been present.  
3.2.3 Lucri faciendi gratia 
Lucri faciendi gratia was not originally incorporated into the Roman law of 
the Twelve Tables. Particular traces of lucri faciendi gratia initially 
appeared in Gellius' Noctes Atticae.75 It was from the Noctes Atticae that a 
passage which resembles lucri faciendi gratia was borrowed. The passage 
reads Qui alienum iacens lucri faciendi causa sustulit, furti obstringitur...., 
that is, a person who "silently carries off another's property for the sake of 
gain is guilty of theft".76 Consequent to this development, the Digest 
followed more or less the particular wording contained in the Noctes 
Atticae. More specifically, it affirms that: Qui alienum quid iacens lucri 
faciendi causa susttulit furti obstringitur, sive scit cuius sit sive ignoravit; 
nihil enim ad futum minuendum facit quod cuius sit ignoret.77 This means 
that a touching or handling of another person's (the owner's) property 
amounts to furtum.78 This responsibility is also extended to situations 
where the property is found lying about by an owner.  
Lucri faciendi gratia implies a benefit, increase or satisfaction. The benefit, 
increase or satisfaction is not restricted to a financial or pecuniary profit. 
Therefore, it is not determined by the presence of financial or monetary 
loss or reward.  
3.2.4 Ipsius rei vel usus eius possessionisve 
The ipsius element reveals three separate categories of furtum.79 These 
groupings are furtum rei, furtum usus and furtum possessionis.80 To begin 
with, furtum rei denotes the actual stealing of property (furtum rei ipsius). 
                                            
72  Frazel 2005 Am J Phil 366-367. 
73  Digest XLVII.2.54. 
74  Rolfe Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius 349. 
75  Watson Western Private Law 271. 
76  Gellius Noctes XI.XVIII.XXI. 
77  Digest XLVII.2.54.4. 
78  Digest XLVII.2.54.4. 
79  See in general Matthaeus De Criminibis; Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas. 
80  Watson 1960 Tijds Rgeschied 202-203. 
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In this instance, a physical touching and handling, that is, contrectatio, of 
property suffices. Secondly, furtum usus basically means "theft of use".81 It 
particularly occurs in cases where property is used unlawfully or 
improperly, or property is obtained without the consent of the owner, or 
property is obtained from an owner for an unambiguous purpose and the 
use of it was beyond the limits imposed by an owner.82 Thirdly, furtum 
possessionis connotes theft of possession. It is in line with the principle 
that furtum can be committed against a person who has an interest in the 
property. These persons include bona fide or legitimate possessors of 
property.  
3.3 Post-classical 
The Institutes describe furtum as contrectatio rei fraudulosa vel ipsius rei 
vel etiam usus eius possessionisve: quod lege naturali prohibitum est 
admittere (Institutes, IV.1.1.).83 This means "a fraudulent and deceitful 
appropriation of property in its entirety, for purposes of either making use 
of property or of attaining possession over property".84 The fact that an 
appropriation must be or must have been in respect of the entire property 
is, it is submitted, elementary. In particular, the inclusion of the notion "in 
its entirety" remedies the uncertainty regarding whether or not the 
contrectatio should be in respect of the part or whole of the property. 
Furthermore, the definition as contained in the Institutes requires that a 
wrong must exist or must have existed. In other words, contrectatio must 
be against the law (that is, fraudulent) and intentional.85 Mackenzie 
particularly favours the description of furtum contained in the Institutes.86 
Mackenzie describes furtum as the "felonious taking or carrying away of 
property of another" in order to make a profit. He also argues that the 
touching or handling must have been made with the intention of stealing 
property.87 Therefore, furtum should be deemed to have been committed 
in circumstances where a person touches or handles property without the 
lawful and required consent (Institutes, IV.1.6.).88  
                                            
81  Adeley et al World Dictionary of Foreign Expressions 152. 
82  R v Olivier 1921 TPD 120. 
83  Institutes IV.1.1. 
84  Sohm Institutes 417. 
85  Howes and Davis Elements of Roman Law 2016. See also Descheemaeker Division 
of Wrongs 3. 
86  MacKenzie Studies in Roman Law 230. 
87  MacKenzie Studies in Roman Law 230. 
88  Institutes IV.1.6. 
MN NJOTINI  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  12 
The Institutes evidently depart from the classical concept of furtum. Firstly, 
they omit the element of lucri faciendi gratia from its definition. There are 
some who support this exclusion. They submit that there is no basis for 
including lucri faciendi gratia in the definition of furtum. There are also 
those who condemn the exclusion. In particular, they submit that the 
definition by the Institutes relies on a non-classical formulation of the 
meaning of furtum. Secondly, the Institutes add another element to furtum. 
This is referred to as the ipsius rei vel etiam usus eius possessionisve. 
The addition is labelled as prima facie outlandish. It is specifically strange 
and bizarre also insofar as it suggests that a "touching or handling of the 
use or possession" of property is possible.  
4 English law 
4.1 Background  
The English law of theft has undergone a number of changes and 
modifications over the years. For example, early England simply 
recognised violent and forceful appropriations and/or dispossessions of 
property as theft. For the purpose of understanding the law of theft in 
England, the concepts "appropriation" and "property" should be examined. 
The term "appropriate" was regarded as having a meaning similar to that 
of "conversion".89 However, due to its vague and misleading nature, the 
concept "conversion" fell into disuse and was later abandoned. Nowadays, 
the term "appropriate" implies any assumption by a person of the rights of 
an owner (that is, a person having possession or control of or over 
property or anything capable of being stolen,90 whether or not such a 
person keeps or deals with the property as an owner.91 Conversely, 
property excluded land, roofs and particular portions of buildings. In some 
cases, title deeds were regarded as incapable of being stolen. For a 
proper comprehension of the notion of property, two periods need to be 
borne in mind. These are the eras before and after 1968. The Larceny Act 
represents the period before 1968 and the Theft Act symbolises the era 
after 1968. Before 1968, for purposes of the law of theft in England 
property included real and personal property, money (for example coins), 
debts, legacies, deeds and instruments relating to the title or right to 
property.92 Accordingly, incorporeal or intangible properties were not 
expressly mentioned. However, it is conceded that section 46(1) of the 
                                            
89  Griew Theft Acts 42. 
90  Section 1(2)(iii) of the Larceny Act of 1916 (the Larceny Act). 
91  Section 3(1) of the Theft Act of 1968 (the Theft Act). 
92  Section 46(1) of the Larceny Act. 
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Larceny Act was capable of being interpreted broadly.93 Such an 
interpretation led or could lead to that section's being read to mean that 
property also encompassed incorporeal things.94 Nevertheless, it is 
evident that after 1968 property also encompassed incorporeal or 
intangible things.95 The aforementioned were referred to as a debt, a right 
under a trust, an obligation which was created by the law, and property 
which is capable of enforcement, such as credit or a benefit.96 
This traditional or strict formulation - forceful appropriations and/or 
dispossessions of property – has since been altered. This change was 
compelled by the necessity to establish a more relaxed and less forceful 
description of theft. Consequently, the capacity of the English criminal law 
was developed to include non-violent and non-forceful appropriations or 
dispossessions of property.97 Following this, a distinction was made 
between robbery and theft. Robbery was an aggravated theft as it involved 
violence.98 It was then treated as an open and less dishonourable offence 
than theft.99 However, theft included a "fraudulent meddling" with another's 
private property.100 This occurs in circumstances where property which 
belongs to another is appropriated surreptitiously (or stealthily)101 and in a 
dishonourable manner.102 Dishonesty exists or is deemed to exist if the 
possession of property is obtained by a trick, intimidation, or it was known 
or could be established that an owner did not consent or could not have 
consented to the obtaining.103  
It is noteworthy that two wrongs constitute theft in England. These are 
larceny104 and receiving stolen property.105 In this chapter the principles of 
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larceny are discussed. These principles are distinguished from those that 
are related to the crime of receiving stolen properties.106 Larceny is 
concerned with the actual stealing or theft of property.107 Receiving stolen 
property relates to the incidents that follow the fact of stealing. In this 
instance, a person must knowingly receive the possession and control of 
property.108 This receiving and control must subsequently be intended to 
permanently deprive the other of such property'.109  
4.2 Larceny 
Various occurrences have had an influence on the development of the 
English law of larceny. These include developments in agriculture and 
industrialisation.110 Because of these advances the reach of the law of 
larceny had to be expanded. It was particularly hoped that this expansion 
would be able to regulate emerging and existing developments in society. 
Some label this evolution as a phenomenon which represents the 
impressions of past or historical "accidents".111 More specifically, they 
argue that it led to the overall law of larceny's being encumbered with a 
jumble of inchoate rules. These rules required that incoherent and 
disjointed systems of legal theories should be introduced.112  
The English principles of theft lack a single and accurate description of 
larceny. There are those who describe larceny as the contrectatio rei 
alienae fraudulenta, cum animo furandi, invito illo domino, cujus rei illa 
fuerit.113 In this instance, a physical and actual removal of property is 
essential.114 The removal is or should be made with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other person of his or her property.115 Others 
describe larceny as the act of: 
(Dealing), from any motive whatever (or whatsoever), unlawfully and without 
claim of right with anything capable of being stolen, in any of the ways in 
which theft can be committed, with the intention of permanently converting 
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that thing to the use of any person other than the general or special owner 
thereof.116 
There are also those who argue inter alia that larceny is a "felonious 
intent" which excludes any claim or colour of right. This view initially 
appeared in an early English case of R v Holloway.117 The argument is 
that in order for larceny to arise at common law there must be a taking and 
carrying away of property; the taking or carrying away of property must be 
or have been trespassory in nature, that is it must amount to a meddling; 
the meddling must be against the will of the other person (owner), and the 
meddling must be or have been made with a felonious intent.118 
4.2.1 Trespassory taking and carrying away 
In England the trespassory taking of property is referred to as "caption" 
and the trespassory carrying away of property is known as 
"asportation".119 Caption is the actual or physical capturing of property. It 
entails a substantial taking or "severance" of property from the possession 
of an owner or a lawful possessor. In addition, it denotes an existence of 
control of or over property. Asportation implies the physical carrying away 
of property.120 The carrying away of property does not need to be 
distant.121 In other words, asportation is presumed to arise in cases where: 
(Every part) of it (the property) is moved from that specific portion of space 
which it occupied before it was moved ... and when it is severed from any 
person or thing to which it was attached in such a manner that the taker has, 
for however short a time, complete control of it.122 
Consequently, even a carrying away of property to a distance of "hair's 
breadth" suffices.123 By way of illustration, asportation must follow the 
taking of property. For example, larceny does not arise and/or is not 
deemed to arise in cases where a thief is found guilty of caption but not for 
asportation.124 By reason of the aforementioned, both the caption and 
asportation must be alleged and proved independently.125 
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It is conceded that the inclusion of caption and asportation represents the 
original and traditional concept of the English law of larceny.126 In 
particular, medieval England described larceny by reference to the 
discernible or observable fact of the taking and carrying away of 
property.127 Consequently, a presence or absence of deceit (deceitful 
behaviour) was irrelevant in determining whether or not larceny had arisen 
in each case. In other words, caption and asportation were adequate in 
order to establish the existence of larceny.128  
The notion of "trespass" appeared during the middle of the thirteenth 
century.129 Trespass is abstracted from the action trespass de bonis 
asportatis. Trespass de bonis asportatis is the right of recourse for the 
"wrongful taking and carrying away" of property and/or certain chattels. 
Within the framework of larceny, trespass de bonis asportatis means that 
both the caption and the asportation must take place in cases where there 
is no claim of right.130 Accordingly, an innocent caption and asportation 
which is made in good faith does not qualify as larceny.131 The trespassory 
nature of the caption and asportation is deduced from the (wrongful or 
unlawful) manner in which the property is acquired.132 The fact that the 
caption and asportation have the effect of depriving a possessor of 
possession demonstrates the existence of the trespassory taking and 
carrying away.133 This view is followed particularly by Pollock and 
Maitland.134 They state that larceny involves "a violation of possession; it is 
an offence against a possessor and therefore can never be committed by 
a possessor".135 
Given the aforementioned, an objective or purposeful inquisition or 
investigation is undertaken. The aforementioned investigation assists in 
establishing whether or not there is a caption and asportation; the caption 
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and asportation deprive the owner of ownership of the property, and the 
caption and asportation are contrary to the wishes of an owner.136  
4.2.2 Absence of consent or invito domino  
Originally, uncertainty existed regarding the relevance or importance of 
invito domino to the English law of larceny. However, it appears that an 
examination of invito domino in Roman law might have motivated its 
adoption in England. It can be deduced from the works of Bracton that 
invito domino is essential to the English law of larceny.137 In particular, he 
relates the concept of invito illo domino to his definition of larceny.138 
Therefore, it is argued that Bracton's insistence on invito domino 
influenced the addition of this notion as one of the elements of larceny. 
Invito domino relates to the mental state of mind or mens rea of a thief at 
the time that larceny is committed. It has its basis in the fact that both the 
caption and asportation must be such that the owner or lawful possessor 
could not have consented or could not be or have been expected to 
consent to the caption and asportation. 
The position relating to invito domino seems to have changed after 1968. 
More specifically, section 1 of the Theft Act excludes the fact that the 
caption and asportation must be without the consent of the owner or a 
lawful possessor. This omission is particularly welcomed by some English 
courts. The most notable case is R v Lawrence.139 In particular, the 
exclusion of invito domino in section 1 of the Theft Act is said to be 
deliberate rather than inadvertent.140 Accordingly, it is noted that the 
presence or absence of consent is simply relevant to the question 
regarding whether or not there was a dishonest appropriation of 
property.141 The requisite dishonesty cannot be inferred and/or implied 
from the existence of consent to the caption and asportation.142 
4.2.3 Animus furandi 
Common-law jurists hold differing views in relation to the significance of 
animus furandi to the English law of larceny. Plucknett argues that the 
early English law of larceny did not rely on intention in order to ascertain if 
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there had been theft or not.143 Consequently, the presence or absence of 
animus was insignificant.144 However, Fletcher and Blackstone provide 
that animus furandi is fundamental to the English law of larceny,145 but 
disagree as to the nature and content of the required animus furandi. 
Blackstone submits that animus furandi serves or can serve as the 
replacement of the Roman law principle of lucri causa faciendi (for the 
sake of profit or gain).146 In particular, the acquiring of property "for the 
sake of gain" is, according to Blackstone, tantamount to the obtaining of 
property "feloniously".147 However, Fletcher opposes the idea that animus 
furandi could be equated to lucri causa faciendi.148 Fletcher particularly 
advocates that the intention to appropriate property is sufficient to attract 
liability for larceny.149 Subsequently, the appropriation must be 
accompanied by an intention to steal'150 or, as sometimes declared 
elsewhere, "an intent to deprive the owner permanently of his or her 
property".151 This intention must be present at the time that the property is 
taken or carried away.152 Consequently, a person (a thief) who takes or 
carries away the property must: 
(know when) he (or she) takes (and carries away) it (the property) that it is 
the property of another person, and he (or she) must take (and carry away) 
deliberately, not by mistake, and with an intention to deprive the person from 
whom it is taken of the property in it.153 
From the discussion above it is established that the English law of larceny 
emphasises a permanent deprivation as opposed to a temporary on 
intermittent deprivation of property.154 This deprivation does not apply to 
things that cannot be physically captured and asported, such as data.155 
Similarly, permanent deprivation is not extended to properties that cannot 
be or are incapable of being owned, such as the sky or the water in the 
seas.  
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5 South African law 
5.1 Background  
The South African law of theft is founded on a mixed and/or hybrid legal 
system.156 Its principles are a combination of the Roman (as influenced by 
the Dutch legal system) and English legal systems. The Roman-Dutch and 
English legal systems were transplanted to the Cape of Good Hope during 
1652 and 1795 respectively.157 Therefore, a study of the principles of theft 
in South Africa is generally partly Roman-Dutch and partly English. These 
principles have evolved over the years and were adapted in a number of 
ways to accommodate new forms of challenges. 
In the section below the developments of the principles of theft in South 
Africa are examined. Accordingly, different nomenclatures that represent 
their development are distinguished. These are referred to as the 
traditional and adapted revisions of theft.  
5.2 Traditional description 
The traditional approach to theft in South Africa is that it amounts to an 
unauthorised contrectatio with the intention to steal property which is 
capable of being stolen.158 The Roman law approach to contrectatio, that 
is the touching or handling, is thus retained. The contrectatio must be or 
must have been illegal or wrongful. An intention to steal, that is animus 
furandi, demonstrates whether or not it is unlawful or wrongful.159 The 
animus must evidence an "evil intent" or "kwaad voornemen" on the part of 
a thief.160 Different types of property are distinguished for the purposes of 
studying theft in South Africa. Some are absolutely incapable of being 
stolen, whereas others are relatively incapable of being stolen. The 
examples of the former are immovable properties, incorporeal properties, 
for example an idea or design, and properties that are common to all, for 
example air, water of the sea, and public streams. The examples of the 
latter are things that are not owned but can be owned (res nullius), one's 
own property (res sua) and wild animals. 
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The traditional formulation of theft has been followed by some courts in 
South Africa. One example is the case of R v Larforte.161 The facts were 
briefly that the accused broke into another person's (Dr. Abdurahman's) 
garage. He then took the latter's motor car. He drove the car around Cape 
Town. While still driving, he bumped it into a lamp post and caused 
damage to it. He then abandoned the car a couple of streets away from 
Dr. Abdurahman's garage. In making a decision, the court stated that theft 
encompasses, amongst other things, an intention to terminate the owner's 
enjoyment of his or her right to ownership. Accordingly, an intention to 
suspend the owner's enjoyment of his or her right to ownership is 
inadequate.162  
It is argued that the traditional description of theft is problematic in a 
number of respects. Firstly, the fact that the requisite contrectatio implies a 
tangible or physical control of or over property is a challenge. In particular, 
it demonstrates a total disregard of the fact that other non-traditional forms 
of property, for example data, are naturally incapable of being physically 
touched or handled. Consequently it fails to recognise that a contrectatio 
in respect of this property can also be carried out in circumstances where 
the actual or physical assumption of control is absent. Secondly, it fails to 
regulate and/or deal with cases where the contrectatio is tempory. One 
such case is R v Dier.163 The Dier case dealt with an appeal from a 
decision of the Magistrate's Court. In this case Dier wished to cross a 
particular river (the Kowie River). In order to carry out his objective, Dier 
needed to board a boat. While still deciding on the next step to take, Dier 
saw that there were ferryboats that were moored at the edge of the river. 
He therefore untied one of those boats and duly crossed the Kowie 
River.164 One of the ferryboats was subsequently found damaged the 
following morning. Therefore, the question was, amongst others, whether 
or not the taking of the ferryboat, although it was not permanent, could be 
prosecuted under the crime of theft.165 The court answered this question in 
the affirmative. In particular, Smith J held that: 
I do not intend by anything ... to lay down that - if a man takes away anything 
belonging to another and applies it to his own purposes, and then abandons 
it with a reckless disregard as to whether it is destroyed or not, and it is (so) 
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destroyed – such an act is not criminal. On the contrary, I am of the opinion 
that a man so acting can clearly be found guilty of theft.166  
In this case the fact that theft should be committed with the necessary 
intention to derive a benefit or gain was omitted. Smith J argued that only 
a fraudulent taking is necessary. The fraudulent taking is commonly 
equated with the notion of contrectatio fraudulosa.167 The presence or not 
of contrectatio fraudulosa requires an enquiry to be made regarding 
whether or not the requisite intention to deprive an owner of the property 
exists. If it exists, contrectatio fraudulosa is inferred from the manner in 
which the property is dealt with after the taking.168 Consequently, a person 
who "fraudulently appropriates" another's property and deprives the owner 
of property is generally liable for theft.169 
The case of R v Olivier170 also exposed the fallacies that are associated 
with the traditional description. In this case the accused, Olivier, and 
various others took property (being a motor vehicle) belonging to another 
person. They used this property for their purposes and thereafter 
carelessly abandoned it. The court per Wessels JP stated that it would be 
an injustice to the innocent party, that is, the owner or lawful possessor, if: 
(Our law) were otherwise for then it would be no offence for a person who is 
a stranger to me to take my motor car out of the garage and drive it to Cape 
Town, leave it at a garage there with as much petrol as it contained, and then 
write to me that he is off to America and that he only took my car for the 
temporary purpose of getting to Table Bay in order to catch the boat.171 
Accordingly, the court developed the element related to "fraud". It stated 
that contrectatio fraudulosa depends, or at least should depend, on the 
existence of an intention to deprive. The requisite intention is deduced 
from the act itself, that is the fraudulent appropriation and the subsequent 
reckless dealing with the property. This is the case because not only is the 
thing required to be taken without the consent of the owner, but also that 
"the taker should have intended to terminate the owner's enjoyment of his 
(or her) rights".172 This requisite "intention" may be inferred from various 
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factors, especially those that are related to the reckless dealing with the 
property.173 
5.3 Adapted description  
Recently the law of theft in South Africa has been developed. These 
growths have consequently led to the acceptance of appropriation, an 
English principle, rather than contrectatio, when a study is made of the 
principles of the law of theft. Snyman provides justification for the move 
from contrectatio to appropriation in South Africa.174 He states the 
following: 
Contrectatio might have been a satisfactory criterion centuries ago when the 
economy was relatively primitive and primarily based on agriculture. In 
today's world with its much more complicated economic structure, it is far 
better to use the more abstract concept of appropriation to describe the act 
of theft than the term contrectatio, unless one discards the original meaning 
of the latter term and uses it merely as a technical erudite-sounding word to 
describe the act of theft.175 
Appropriation is here used to mean the intention to deprive the owner of 
the benefits of ownership. It is simply the assumption of control of or over 
the property of another person. This control does not necessarily translate 
into a touching or handling of property. It is equated with the gaining of 
possession of or meddling with property.176  
The meaning and importance of that which is enunciated by Snyman 
above can be deduced by examining the cases pertaining to the 
appropriation of certain intangible property. These are fully captured in, 
amongst others, the cases of S v Kotze,177 S v Mintoor,178 Nissan South 
Africa (Pty) Limited v Marnitz (stand 1 at 6 Aeroport (Pty) Limited 
intervening)179 and S v Ndebele.180 These cases acknowledge the impact 
that recent developments have made on the principles of theft. Of 
particular importance for the purposes of this paper is the traditional 
Roman law element of contrectatio. It has already been stated that this 
element requires that a physical touching or handling of property capable 
of being stolen be made. Within the South African context, contrectatio is 
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interpreted to mean the assumption, touching or handling of the property 
of another. 
The Ndebele case is significant to this paper. It criticises the decision of 
the court in the Mintoor case.181 In the Mintoor case the court had to 
decide whether electricity could be a subject of theft or not. In responding 
to this question the court reiterated the view that things which do not have 
corporeal existence are incapable of being stolen.182 Consequently, it was 
stated that electricity is energy and that energy is incapable of being 
stolen.183 Following this line of reasoning the court in the Ndebele case 
held that the Mintoor case disregarded existing authority and failed to 
consider the existing developments in the law of theft.184 The facts in the 
Ndebele case were briefly that the accused (Ndebele and others) faced a 
number of charges regarding inter alia the theft of vending machines and 
electricity belonging to Eskom. The position regarding the theft of the 
machines was easy to determine. These were tangible objects or property 
and a contrectatio in relation to them was established. The most difficulty 
question was whether or not electricity is capable of being stolen. In other 
words, is contrectatio of or over electricity possible? Following the decision 
in the Mintoor case, it was submitted on behalf of the accused that 
electricity "could not be stolen".185 In other words, a contrectatio in respect 
of electricity is impossible either in fact or the law.  
Before it could comment on this, the court referred to a number of previous 
court decisions (for example, S v Kotze, S v Mintoor, Nissan South Africa 
(Pty) Limited v Marnitz (stand 1 at 6 Aeroport (Pty) Limited intervening) 
and S v Harper186) and surmised that: 
It appeared to me that there was a more than slight possibility (which would 
be more conveniently decided at the end of the case) that electricity is in fact 
capable of theft and that the law had already been advanced by judgements 
relating, in particular, to theft of incorporeals.187 
Consequently, the court examined the meaning and importance of 
contrectatio for the purposes of the law of theft in South Africa. It 
acknowledged that according to Roman-Dutch law only corporeal or 
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movable things are capable of being stolen.188 Therefore, the property 
stolen must be "…'n selfstandige deel van die stoflike natuur".189 In other 
words, the thing must belong to the owner or form part of the latter's 
estate.190 However, it applied S v Harper (where it was said that an 
incorporeal is capable of being stolen)191 and held that contrectatio is or 
should not only be constituted by the physical touching or handling of 
property. It is or should also be constituted by an appropriation of a 
"characteristic which attaches to a thing and by depriving the owner of that 
characteristic".192 This is the case because if it were to be held that: 
Electricity is incapable of being stolen, then anyone would be entitled without 
permission of the owner to attach a load to his batteries and deplete the 
energy within them, thereby rendering the batteries useless. Yet nothing will 
have been stolen. Nothing physically has been taken from the battery; 
however, its characteristics have changed.193 
In view of the aforementioned, the court concluded that electricity can, 
despite the fact that it amounts only to energy and is incorporeal property, 
be the object of theft.194 
In addition to this, two occurrences are identified that mark the expansion 
of the principles of theft beyond their traditional format. These are the 
legislative and judicial interventions. The legislative intervention came in 
the form of the Game Theft Act195 and the Copyright Act,196 among 
others.197 These acts particularly acknowledge that there is a change in 
modern legal thinking regarding the proper understanding of theft. The 
Game Theft Act accepts that contrectatio fraudulosa can be carried out to 
property which traditionally was regarded as being incapable of being 
stolen. Such property includes wild animals.198 In this respect, the Game 
Theft Act protects the rights that the owners have over this property.199 
The Copyright Act protects the intellectual property of a person. This is the 
products of a person's mind, such as the ideas.200 The Copyright Act 
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particularly forbids others from wrongfully appropriating or interfering with 
this property.201 
Furthermore, the courts have also read the principles of theft to mean that 
appropriation can be undertaken in respect of other intangible or 
incorporeal objects. An example is the case of S v Graham.202 In this case, 
company (A) was on the verge of being liquidated. During this period, A 
received a cheque amounting to thirty-seven thousand one hundred and 
fifty three rand eighty eight cents (R 7 153.88). It was later established that 
the cheque had been erroneously sent to A. A Managing Director of A 
(Graham) was aware of the mistake. However, Graham paid and/or 
caused the cheque to be paid to the overdrawn bank account of A. 
Graham thought that A would recover from its debts and thereafter be in a 
position to repay the money. However, A was finally wound up. At the time 
of its winding up only a portion of the money was repaid. Graham was 
charged in his personal capacity with the theft of the cheque and/or the 
sum of money paid to A.203 The question was whether the paying of the 
cheque into A's account amounted to theft or not.204 The court conceded 
to the fact that traditionally theft amounts to a physical and actual 
appropriation of property. In this respect, tangible and corporeal objects, 
save where these are expressly or impliedly excluded, constitute the 
aforesaid property. However, the court stated that the principles of theft 
are founded on a "living system". This system is flexible and adaptable. In 
addition, this flexibility enables the system to be in touch with current 
realities and to be able to respond to existing societal conditions.205 
Consequently, the court concluded that money is capable of being stolen 
even in cases where it is represented by entries in books of accounts, 
such as credits.206 
Having examined the developments described above, it is now possible to 
investigate the position of data in the law of theft. The importance of doing 
so is drawn from the fact that data has now become a "public good".207 
Private and public institutions, governments, businesses and individuals 
expend time, effort and money to gather information.208 Following these 
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efforts, they then (reasonably) believe that they have real rights in or over 
this information.209 Furthermore, information or other data can be used in 
order to prevent other crimes, for example, money laundering and 
terrorism or terrorist financing.210  
6 ICT and its effects 
Recent ICTs have had an effect on the traditional principles of furtum or 
theft. For example, the law of theft deals with the contrectatio of property. 
Although there was doubt in Classical Rome on whether contrectatio 
should be in respect of the whole or part of the property, post-classical 
Roman law agreed that it must be in relation to the entire property. The 
contrectatio has to be made with the aim of deriving a benefit. This benefit 
is not limited only to pecuniary income. It must be made with the 
necessary intention, that is, dolus malus or invito domino. Animus furandi 
should accompany the touching or handling. In South Africa this animus 
must relate to an intention to deprive the owner of the property of the 
benefits of ownership. The aforementioned standpoint seems to be 
similarly adopted in England. For example, it is required that there should 
be a permanent deprivation of property. In other words, there has to be 
caption and asportation. This then excludes a deprivation which on the 
facts appears to be temporary.211 The deprivation has to be effected over 
property which is capable of being stolen. It does not extend to objects or 
things that cannot be physically or actually captured and carried away, 
such as data.212  
The emergence of ICTs particularly exposes the setbacks in the study of 
furtum or theft. An example is a case where data is accessed from a 
source (a document or a computer) without the consent of the owner. Data 
is generally incorporeal or intangible property.213 However, this recognition 
does not necessarily imply that the existing principles of theft regard it as 
being capable of being stolen. This was accepted in one of the famous 
English cases of Oxford v Moss. The facts in this case were briefly that: 
The defendant (Moss) was a student in the Faculty of Engineering at the 
University of London. It was alleged that the defendant dishonestly took 
physical possession of certain confidential information. The information 
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was contained in examination questions for a Civil Engineering 
examination.214 The question before the court was whether or not Moss 
stole the information which was contained in those question papers. It was 
contended on behalf of Moss that he did not intend to deprive the 
university or the senate permanently of the exam paper. He simply wished 
to memorise the questions in order to prepare for the exams. The court, 
per Smith J, conceded that the defendant's conduct amounted to cheating. 
Given this dishonesty, society condemns or should condemn such 
conduct.215 However, the court concluded that the information, and not the 
exam question paper, was not property for the purposes of the law of theft. 
Consequently, the defendant was incapable of taking such information 
from the plaintiff.216  
The court in Oxford v Moss strictly applied the principles of furtum or theft. 
It relied on the fact that data cannot be touched or handled and that it can 
be accessed and/or made available to different users without actually or 
physically dispossessing the lawful owner or possessor. However, this 
conclusion is inconsistent with recent societal developments. These 
developments have resulted in the emergence of contemporary wrongs. 
An example is electronic or e-crimes such as phishing, computer cracking, 
distributed denial of service attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. E-
crimes are crimes involving computers.217 They include a dishonest 
conduct or act which is associated with the mechanical processing or 
transmission of data.218 In this instance, a complete dispossession of data 
is not a requirement. It may be appropriated even though a person (or 
owner) still possesses the original thereof. Also, the presence of an 
intention to appropriate is immaterial. However, its presence could assist 
in establishing the substance of e-crimes.219  
The position described above does not appear to have been adequately 
addressed by Chapter XIII of the ECT Act. This Chapter specifically deals 
with "cybercrimes" as opposed to the theft of information online. Simply, it 
prohibits the actions of a person who, after taking note of any data, 
becomes aware of the fact that he or she is not authorised to access, 
intercept or interfere with that data and, despite this awareness, still 
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continues to access, intercept or interfere with that data.220 From this, 
Chapter XIII of the ECT Act has to be distinguished from sections 107 and 
108 of the Ghanaian Electronic Transactions Act.221 On the one hand, 
section 107 of the Act regulates the theft or stealing of information online. 
It states that theft arises in situations where anything222 is "done using an 
electronic processing or procuring procedure system whether or not the 
appropriation was by use of an electronic processing procedure".223 This is 
the case even in circumstances where the medium used in the theft was, 
in whole or in part, an electronic record.224 On the other hand, section 108 
of the Transactions Act covers the unlawful appropriation of information 
online. It provides that appropriation applies to "anything whether or not 
the moving, taking, obtaining, carrying away or dealing is by means of an 
electronic processing or procuring procedure in part or in whole.225  
In view of the above, it is submitted that the Ndebele case remains the 
closest step taken by South Africa towards recognising that non-traditional 
forms of property such as data are also capable of being stolen. This case 
states that theft of res incorporeal is possible in South Africa. More 
specifically, it regards contrectatio as amounting to an appropriation of the 
special characteristics which are attached to the property and the 
consequent deprivation of ownership. However, the Ndebele case still 
leaves open the question relating to whether or not data is capable of 
being stolen. 
7 Conclusion 
The fundamental premise of the law of theft both in Roman and South 
African law of theft is that there must be a contrectatio of or over property. 
This entails an assumption of control of or over the property of another. 
The object of contrectatio must thus be to permanently deprive the other 
person or owner of the benefits of property. Also, it must be made with the 
necessary animus, that is the animus furandi.226 Although this approach 
seems to have been subsequently reformed, the current position is that a 
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contrectatio over property must still exist. Given the fact that data cannot 
be touched or handled, contrectatio in respect of this property is therefore 
impossible. This position is not sufficiently addressed by the English law 
notion of appropriation. In particular, appropriation requires that there 
should be a definite or actual meddling with the property of another before 
theft can be deemed to arise. This meddling must give rise to a physical 
taking and carrying away of property. In these circumstances, the caption 
and asportation must be invito domino.  
It is observed that the law of theft is founded on a living system of rules or 
principles. This system is flexible and adaptable. It is particularly in touch 
with current societal realities. In Rome the classical formulation of furtum 
was in part deviated from during the post-classical study of furtum. 
Similarly, the description of theft in both England and South Africa was 
adapted in order to accommodate novel developments. The most 
important of these were commerce, industry and agriculture. These 
alterations resulted in the existence of new forms of property which were 
conventionally regarded as wholly or partially incapable of being stolen or 
being included into the category of property capable of theft.227 However, 
these developments in the law of theft fail to adequately respond to the 
question of whether or not it is legally possible to steal data. This 
conclusion is drawn from the fact that the existing principles of theft 
continue to perpetuate the view that theft amounts to an actual or physical 
assumption of control of property. In other words, theft amounts to the 
deprivation of the rights of ownership over property. Consequently, it is not 
recognised that an appropriation of data does not necessarily result in the 
actual taking and carrying away of that data. More specifically, data is 
appropriated in situations where there is wrongful interference with the 
owner's rights of use and enjoyment of the said data. This interference can 
sometimes arise in situations where the owner is dispossessed of only the 
part or a copy of the data. 
With this in mind, it is proposed that a change in thinking is necessary. 
This shift should be in line with current developments, especially those 
that are compelled by the emergence of novel forms of technology. This 
does not necessarily entail that the principles of theft need be developed. 
It simply affirms that data may be appropriated, albeit differently from the 
traditional methods. Therefore, a contrectatio in respect of this property 
ought to be concentrated on the appropriation of its characteristics, 
namely, the sensitivities of a computer user, and the eventual deprivation 
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thereof. If, indeed, it becomes necessary to expand the principles of theft 
so as to address these recent developments, it is recommended that the 
reasoning in the case of S v Graham should be followed. Accordingly, any 
change or alteration to the principles of theft should be minimal. In 
particular, the change ought to be brought about in a manner which retains 
the essential elements of theft.  
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